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CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Appellant, Ralph Tolman, through counsel, Loni F. 
DeLand, petitions this Court for a rehearing on issues of fact 
and law which the court in its decision here, entered April 27, 
1989, has overlooked or misapprehended. 
This petition is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
I certify that this Petition is presented in good faith 
and not for delay. 
L(M P. DeLAND 
Attorney for Appellant Tolman 
JURISDICTION, BASES AND NATURE OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its Opinion herein 
under date of April 27, 1989; (Judge Greenwood; Judge Garff 
concurring; Judge Davidson concurring in the result). 
The Opinion affirmed Appellant's appeal from his 
conviction of witness tampering but reversed his conviction of 
official misconduct. 
Appellant hereby petitions this Court for a re-hearing 
of the issues hereinafter set forth, as to the affirmance of the 
witness tampering conviction, on the bases that the court misap-
prehended the various facts applied to the law. 
The court has continuing and discretionary jurisdiction 
to re-hear this matter pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE, THE LAW 
AND THE ISSUES FOR RE-HEARING 
Appellant relies upon the law and the facts presented 
by the parties' briefs on appeal, the record and prior oral 
argument with appropriate references and supplemental citations 
hereinafter inserted. 
Appellant has narrowed the issues for re-hearing to 
those which apply to the court's perceived misapprehension of the 
facts, which issues are contained in the descriptive headings of 
each argument. 
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I. THE COURT HAS MISAPPREHENDED THE 
FACTUAL BASES OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL IN THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDING 
A. IMPROPER NOTICE 
This Court has misapplied the State v. Ruggeri, 429 
P.2d 969, standard to these facts. Ruggeri circumstances mandate 
that any "target" of an official investigation be provided 
adequate notice. Adequacy of notice has been uniformly held to 
include a sufficient time prior to the hearing or questioning; 
specific and clear enumeration of the allegations; full explana-
tion of rights regarding counsel, self incrimination, etc. In the 
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah, 1988), 
That Tolman was a target is admitted. So is the fact 
that he was the only target who did not receive a letter in 
advance telling him of his status. 
This Court either fails to perceive or ignores the 
inequal treatment and the failure to provide "adequate" or 
Ruggeri-type notice. This Court says that he was given suffi-
cient oral notice at the entrance to the grand jury room. 
A re-examination of the facts and the law dispels the 
notion that any notice given orally or at the last moment and 
without the warning required by statute can ever be adequate. 
The court also accepts the notion that being told one 
is a "subject" of inquiry is an adequate substitute for the due 
process requirement which requires that one be advised of the 
specific nature of the allegations, a tenet so fundamental in the 
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state and federal constitutions, (and the stare decisus inter-
preting the right), that the point leaves little room for debate. 
U.S. Constitution, Amendments Five, Six and Fourteen; Constitu-
tion of Utah, Article I, Section 12; Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 
496 (1972); Choung v. California, 320 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Cal. 
1970) . 
B. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Of greater import is the courtfs view of Tolman's right 
to counsel in the proceedings. 
What the court misapprehends is this: Tolman was the 
only witness who was told his attorney could not accompany him 
into the proceedings. After Tolman's appearance, the special 
prosecutors "realized (their) error" and allowed every witness 
the opportunity to have counsel present. 
The Utah Code is clear. A subject of an investigation, 
before providing grand jury testimony, has a right to have 
counsel "present," which presumably includes the right to be so 
informed, (as opposed to being told by those charged with the 
powers of the law that the right to counsel does not include 
presence, only a hallway sitter.) 
The prosecutors1 "mistake" was either misconduct or 
negligent ignorance of the very law they were specially appointed 
to wield. Either way, a fundamental right to due process was 
denied just the same as if a trial court "forgot" to impanel a 
jury. 
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So, how can the court decide that Tolman was advised of 
his right to counsel if the advice was erroneous? The court 
cannot conclude that Tolman would have waived his right to 
counsel if he was properly advised that counsel could sit at his 
side instead of in the hall. 
Aside from the denial of equal protection, a substan-
tive constitutional right was violated, A substantive violation 
cannot be cured by providing adequate procedural due process, 
then or later, as the court seems to believe. A substantive 
violation is complete when it occurs and its taint poisons 
everything that is derived from it. Wong Sun v. United States 
371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
Consider the hypothetical of a robber who is arrested 
and before questioning is given his Miranda rights. ESut the 
police officer erroneously tells him that if he cannot afford a 
lawyer one will not be appointed or tells him that his lawyer 
cannot be present during questioning. 
Given either misperception, the court would summarily 
suppress any statement obtained thereafter. While the courts 
have made certain exceptions to Miranda as it relates to the 
right to remain silent, (Fifth Amendment), the courts have 
steadfastly and strictly construed the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel as inviolate. While silence may be broken, in certain 
circumstances, without interference with the right to remain so, 
no court has, (until now), found a waiver of counsel to be 
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knowing and intelligent where the rights have not been fully and 
clearly explained and all safeguards present. 
The record before this Court not only fails to provide 
the factual bases from which the state1s burden can be met in 
terms of Tolman!s Sixth Amendment rights during the Grand Jury 
proceedings, it contains the admission that the right to counsel 
was only a partial, and therefore unconstitutional, explanation. 
SUMMARY 
The court has not even addressed the facts which, 
without dispute, show that Appellant was the only subject not 
given advance, written, specific notice of such and was the only 
witness advised that right to counsel did not allow counsel 
present, contrary to Utah law. 
If the court finds no merit to the prosecutor miscon-
duct claims and therefore ignores those issues, it should at 
least apply these facts to the law and address the unintentional 
but equally unconstitutional interference with substantive due 
process. 
By validating the conduct of the prosecutors herein, 
the court will signal their successors of at least two methods of 
safely violating constitutional and statutory rights. Interfer-
ence with attorney-client rights will surely result in far more 
convictions; surprise and discriminatory notice will catch the 
rest of the bad guys off guard. 
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Although the right to counsel is a constitutional one 
generally applicable in custodial situations or at critical 
stages of post-arrest proceedings, the right may be defined by 
statute (if no narrowing of constitutional right is decreed), and 
the right thereto is a strictly construed one. In this case that 
means strict compliance with the "presence" right. 
If the court correctly reviews the undisputed facts it 
can only conclude that the right to counsel was never made fully 
available and could not be cured by subsequent restoration. 
This Court errs in its belief, if it so believes, that 
the partial denial of right to counsel herein was harmless. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the denial of the full and 
complete right to counsel can "never" be harmless error. 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
II. THE COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY 
DISTINGUISH THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE RE: JUROR PRAYER 
The court views the jurorfs prayer in State v. DeMille, 
756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988), as the clone of the prayer issue of 
the jury in this case. 
The facts are clearly distinguishable. In DeMille one 
juror's pre-deliberation prayer was "answered" and her answer was 
her motivation in the persuasion of others during deliberation. 
It is unknown whether anyone but the one juror in 
DeMille based their verdict on the inspiration. 
Furthermore, the DeMille juror spoke of "inspiration11 
and of Godfs will. 
The facts in Tolman should not be viewed as a "freedom 
of religion" question but rather as a "separation of church and 
state," issue, among other things. 
In Tolman, it was not just God and it was not just 
inspiration followed by persuasion. It was the Mormon priesthood 
being asserted as the authority - not the Constitution; not the 
court. Three fourths of the jury placed their decision in the 
hands of the self-appointed juror-authority due to his priesthood 
then accepted his revelation as they would a coin flip. They 
were not persuaded by the evidence or by one juror's inspired 
belief but by an en masse acquiescence to abide by the revelation 
communicated through the priesthood of a common religion to which 
adherence in all spiritual matters is an unbending requirement of 
membership. 
III. THE COURT DID NOT APPARENTLY RECOGNIZE 
THE FACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENT RE: BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Appellant, only a few months prior to oral argument, 
supplemented his briefs with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
State v. Bell, 92 U.A.R. 22 (S.C. 9/30/88), which placed a heavy 
burden on the state to justify opposition to providing a Bill of 
Particulars and on the limits of a trial court's discretion in 
denying a defendant's motion therefore. 
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The record speaks loud and clear concerning the broad 
and ambiguous factual bases upon which the state relied at 
various times in the trial and pre-trial proceedings. The 
defense frequently demanded to know which acts and/or which 
sub-sections of crimes charged were material to the state's 
prosecution, as pointed out in Appellantfs brief. 
This Court has failed to even address the issues 
concerning the Bill of Particulars, merely stating that remaining 
issues had no merit. 
The Utah Supreme Court (in Bell) clearly holds that 
these facts do have merit and therefore it would appear that this 
Court is either in direct conflict with the Bell decision or has 
failed to recognize that the facts herein are Bell facts. 
IV. THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE MERITS OF APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE 
Trial courts and even appellate courts generally avoid 
questions of constitutionality when the case can be disposed of 
on other grounds. In this case, however, Appellant has chal-
lenged the constitutionality of §76-8-508, Utah Code Annotated, 
(Tampering With a Witness), the sole remaining crime of which 
Tolman remains convicted, and this Court failed to address the 
issue, (one of the "meritless" issues), though the case has not 
been disposed of on other grounds. 
The factual bases for affirming the conviction herein 
are among the actus rea of the statute which Appellant 
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challenges. It is this Court's obligation to address the issues 
and state its reasons for its decision. 
V. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
FACTS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD 
The court finds sufficient evidence from which a jury 
could find Appellant guilty of tampering with a witness. 
In doing so, it misapprehends the facts in the record. 
The record, to support the courtfs affirmance must 
contain factual evidence as to each element of the crime. 
The element of "intent" cannot be proved from the 
record or from any reasonable inference therefrom. 
The only two witnesses who testified concerning 
Tolman1s request for C. Dean Larsen to secrete the "first" report 
were Tolman and Larsen. 
Both witnesses provided testimony that Tolman requested 
the report be destroyed or hidden. But both also say Tolman1s 
reasons therefore were to keep Harman, (Tolman1s boss), from 
finding out he had violated an office policy by giving out a 
report without authorization. 
More importantly, both witnesses agree that Tolman 
never asked Larsen to testify untruthfully. On the contrary, 
Tolman told him to tell the truth and told him he (Tolman) would 
also testify, if called, to the facts contained in the report. 
Further, Larsen said he lied about having Tolman's report not 
because Tolman asked him to do so but because he independently 
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sought to protect Tolman. The only dispute in the record is over 
Tolman's intent when asking Larsen to get rid of the report. 
Not once does the record show even the hint of an 
intent to tamper with Larsen1s testimony. 
So, the worst that can be said is that Tolman tampered 
with evidence. He was not convicted, however, of that crime, 
though he was charged. 
The evidence as to the elements of intent and "a 
proceeding", at least, is clearly insufficient to support guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Though it might come up to a negli-
gence standard with a preponderance burden, the court is amiss, 
upon these facts, to affirm an intentional tampering with a 
witness verdict. 
VI. THE COURT HAS APPLIED THE FACTS 
WITH INCONSISTENT RESULTS 
A. MISCONDUCT v. TAMPERING 
The court reversed the official misconduct verdict but 
affirmed tampering. How does a sworn peace officer tamper with a 
witness and not commit a breach of his duties imposed by law? 
B. TOLMAN v. HARMAN 
In reversing Harmanfs conviction for Tampering with 
Evidence in State v. Harman, Case No. 870290-CA, the companion 
case hereto, the court pointed out that Harman refused to accept 
the first report because of the work product rather than to hide 
its evidentiary contents from potential plaintiffs. It was also 
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pointed out that the first report enjoyed a broad in-house 
circulation and that the original was kept on file. 
In Tolman the facts are the same as to the distribution 
of the copies of the first report. And, like Harman, Tolman 
didn't seek to hide the factual evidence of the first report but 
only the fact that he had given an extra copy to an outsider. 
Affirming Tolman but reversing Harman is clearly 
inconsistent. How could the court find it reasonable to presume 
Tolman, but not Harman, had the intent to prevent evidence (via a 
witness) from reaching an official proceeding by tampering with 
only one of numerous witnesses to the same facts (of the reports 
contents), with copies of the report widely distributed, with he_ 
being the one with the original (filed) report, and with he being 
the one broadcasting the facts to everyone who will listen. The 
two decisions are not only inconsistent, the instant one defies 
logic as to the facts when applied to the law and the standard of 
proof. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should grant 
re-hearing in this matter. 
DATED this // day of May, 1989. 
LOOT F.v'DeLAND 
Attorney for Appellant Tolman 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '/ day of May, 1989, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, with postage 
prepaid fully thereon, to the Utah Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; and Edward K. Brass, 321 
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
(fiy\, A Jlr 
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